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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
-VS-
RAMONA MERRITT JOHNSON, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Appellant against 
the Respondent on an Order to Show Cause and Declaration 
in Re Contempt to show why the Respondent should not be 
judged guilty of contempt of court and punished accordingly 
for willfully disobeying an order of the District Court 
issued on the 12th day of September, 1975. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon a hearing held in the lower court before a judge 
who was not the judge that had issued the original Decree 
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of Divorce in the District Court, the hearing judge denied 
the Appellant an order compelling the Respondent to 
comply with the Decree of Divorce granted by the District 
Court denying relief to Appellant upon the alleged grounds 
of "Equitably Clean Hands Doctrine." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court, nullifying the order of the hearing judge wherein 
the court refused to uphold the decree that was granted in 
the lower court, and compelling the Respondent to comply 
with the final Decree of Divorce as ordered and to award to 
the Appellant reasonable attorney fees and costs as to the 
appealed from denial of an Order to Show Cause. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, who was the Defendant in the lower court, 
will be referred to in this brief as "wife," and the Re-
spondent, who was the Plaintiff in the lower court, will 
be referred to in this brief as "husband." 
A Complaint was filed by the husband on November 15, 
1974, seeking a Decree of Divorce from his wife with whom 
he had been intermarried since August 19, 1948, and with 
whom five children have been born as the issue of said 
marriage. (R-3) 
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/V \~\<„ cir-, nf t lie- f j line * • r "omplain*" ' A I , 
David, v. .*.;>. 
years ^ i - J :^ others having L-e:: uniancipated 
and tlv usband rh I^T
 ;<ru custody -^ ' < lo ehilare:. 
« • • . • i- Amende^, c. if., iaint wa:- : ile^ 
by the husband (R-0) to which the wife filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim (R-10-1 \) prayijui I i ludqmcnt >c aaainsl 
the i-uob.-v, an, i^-eking ti.e si:-, o! $2(10,00 per month fur 
child support, and $150. monthly as and for alimony, in 
addili'iu) in pa1 -- . . i.l a distribution ot the 
assets ol the i-'ir:: i, estate. 
The husband — *~r: --v- a* Hi.I I ; , i j Fore 
Clearfield, Ut^*., .•...* - •* f -,ke home pay from his employ-
ment in the amount •.:" £n;-**. .7 monthly, plus a n ^ ' ^ n 
Force R'dut* ml; * e ainoutil ot" S.* ror 
a net monthly take home y. r •: the amount - :" :-*-*,."•'-. (R-14) 
On February 0, 1'") 7 r» , the H'onora 1»1 e Rona.1 d n n /»II 
issued ,iJi ""jjrdei" on Order to Show Cause requirincj that the 
husband pay $200,00 per month for support and the obliga-
tions of the parties, and fwri her thai I he husband 
make the house payments and pay for the utilities on 
a temporary basis and allowing to the husband the rental 
from a hasenienJ, apartment as additional income, (R-2'l ) 
On May 23, 1975, a further Order to Show Cause in 
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Re Contempt was brought by the wife seeking to compel the 
husband to obey the order of the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde 
that had previously been issued on February 6, 1975. 
(R-57) 
The hearing on the Order to Show Cause in Re Con-
~~ tempt was held before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist on 
-••-- June 10, 1975, and an order was entered by the court 
requiring the husband to pay only $35.00 on utilities 
until further order of the court. 
The affidavit of the wife evidenced that utilities 
for the months of February, March, April, and May of 1975, 
which the court's order of February 6, 1975, had required 
the husband to pay, was deficient in that the husband had 
paid only $136.49, and that the husband had not made a 
house payment for the month of February for a total defi-
ciency of $256.14. 
On June 18, 1975, the Honorable Calvin Gould issued 
an Order to Show Cause why the husband should not be 
compelled to pay the sum of $256.14. (R-66) 
On a hearing before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist 
on June 17, 1975, the court ordered that the matter of the 
deficiency be held in abeyance until the beginning of the 
trial in the divorce matter, and ordering the husband to 
pay $35.00 towards utilities until further ordered. (R-66) 
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Upon trial on the matter of the divorce decree, the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde did on June 30, 1975, grant a 
Decree of Divorce, granting same to the wife upon her 
counterclaim, and ordering the husband to pay $100.00 per 
month for the support of the one minor child until he 
reaches the age of majority, and to pay the sum of $200.00 
per month alimony to the wife. The court in addition to 
other division of the assets of the marital estate further 
ordered the husband to pay all of the outstanding obliga-
tions of the parties, excepting the mortgage on the house 
which had been awarded to the wife, and also ordered the 
husband to pay the utility bills that were in dispute. A 
statement of the income, assets, and liabilities of the 
parties was sworn to by the wife in June of 1975, and in 
it was set forth a dental bill to a Dr. Stephen Morgan in 
the sum of $275.00, and also an indebtedness to one, Franca 
Dunham, in the amount of $250.00. (R-75-76) This affidavit 
was filed with the court prior to the entry by the court of 
the Decree of Divorce, which Decree of Divorce was signed 
and entered by the court on September 12, 1975. (R-83) 
The court further in its final decree ordered the 
husband to pay the utility bills which were in dispute, 
and to reimburse the wife for any payments of the same 
made by the wife. 
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On February 19, 1976, an Order to Show Cause and 
Declaration in Re Contempt was filed by the wife against 
the husband alleging that the husband had failed to pay 
$28.00 due and owing to Tanner Clinic, $260.00 due and 
owing to Dr. Stephen Morgan, $250.00 due and owing to 
Mrs. Franca Dunham, property taxes on the family home 
in the sum of $239.00, and utilities in the amount of 
$23.93; and that the husband was required to pay the sum 
of $15.00 to Dr. Broadbent, and attorney fees in the sum 
of $400.00 which were due and owing to the wifefs attorney 
and have not been paid. (R-88) 
The husband filed an affidavit in answer to the 
Order to Show Cause making an allegation that when he 
picked up the camper and truck granted to him in the Decree 
of Divorce that sugar had been dumped in the gas tank of 
the truck and other damage done to the upholstery and 
water lines of the camper alleging that the fault was with 
the wife in that she had possession of the vehicle pre-
viously. (R-84-85) 
The hearing was held on the matter on March 19, 1976, 
before the Honorable Calvin Gould with the court denying 
to the wife payment of the dentist bill to Dr. Morgan, and 
the payment of the bill to Franca Dunham, which had been 
specifically set forth in the affidavit of indebtedness 
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prior to the Decree of Divorce granted by the Honorable 
Ronald 0. Hyde, and concluding that the damage to the truck 
and camper having been found when picked up by the husband 
and the equipment having been previously in the back yard 
of the premises wherein the wife resided, that the judgment 
of the District Court in the Decree of Divorce would not 
i 
be upheld on the basis that the court denied any relief to 
the wife, based on "Equitably Clean Hands Doctrine." 
(R-93-94) The Order to Show Cause thereby being denied and 
dismissed and thereby denying to the wife the award made 
by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde in the Decree of Divorce 
granted by said court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A DISTRICT COURT JUDGE OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
CANNOT ACT AS AN APPELLATE JUDGE. 
The Decree of Divorce was granted by the Honorable 
Ronald 0. Hyde, a judge of the Second Judicial District 
Court, on September 12, 1975, awarding a Decree of Divorce 
on the counterclaim of the wife and ordering the husband 
to perform as follows: 
The husband to pay the sum of $100.00 a month for 
the support of the one minor child. 
Husband to pay $200.00 per month alimony to the 
-7-
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wife. 
Awarding the wife the house and real property in 
Layton, Utah, subject to a mortgage thereon. 
Awarding to the wife the household furniture and 
fixtures of said house and real property. 
Awarding the husband a double wide mobile home, 
subject to the mortgage thereon. 
Husband being awarded a Vista Liner camper, a pickup 
truck, a 1969 Ford Galaxy and a 1967 Mustang. 
The wife awarded a 1960 Opel. 
The contract interest that the parties have in pro-
perty in Kaysville, Utah, being awarded to the wife. 
Husband being awarded a life insurance policy, his 
own counties insurance, and retirement, and whatever savings 
the husband had in a credit union. 
The husband ordered to pay all of the outstanding 
obligations of the parties, except the mortgage on the 
house. 
The husband ordered to pay the utility bills in 
dispute, to reimburse the wife for any payment of same. 
(R-82-83) 
The other parts of the decree are not pertinent 
to the matter before the court. 
Prior to the rendering of the Decree of Divorce, 
which occurred on September 12, 1975, affidavit was filed 
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by the wife before trial in the matter in which was set 
forth an indebtedness due and owing to a Dr. Thomas 
Broadbent in the amount of $15.00; a sum due to Tanner 
Clinic in the amount of $28.00; an amount due to a den-
tist, Stephen Morgan, in the amount of $275.00; and a 
sum due and owing to a Franca Dunham, in the amount of 
$250.00. (R-75-76) 
The order appealed from denied enforcement of the 
judgment sought by the wife for the payment to Dr. Morgan 
of the sum of $275.00; for the payment to Franca Dunham 
of the sum of $250.00, which had been loaned to the wife 
when the husband had failed to provide any funds for the 
living expense of the wife (R-93-94); the payment of 
deficiency on the utility payments, among other items 
which were alleged as deficient by the wife. (R-55-66) 
This court previously held in Harward v. Harward, 
526 P.2d 1183, Supreme Court of Utah (1974), the order 
made by a court is binding upon all of the parties unless 
and until they are reversed upon appeal to the Supreme 
Court and that a fellow judge cannot set them aside. 
In the matter of the Estate of Charles H. Mecham v. 
Mecham, 537 P.2d 312, Supreme Court of Utah (June 1975), 
in a case where a judge handling the calendar had juris-
diction to act on a motion and where he vacated the first 
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order, and the judge's order was not changed or appealed 
fromf it became the effective order in the case, and that 
a third judge could not vacate the order of the second 
judge, specifically holding that a judge of one division 
of the same court cannot act as an appellate court and 
overrule another such judge. 
I In the instant matter before the court we are con-
cerned with a specific Decree of Divorce in which the 
second judge of the same concurrent jurisdiction while 
denying any motion for modification of the judgment of the 
previous court of competent jurisdiction that granted the 
Decree of Divorce, did in effect hold that the court could 
punish and in effect change the judgment of the previous 
original judge upon the basis that the wife seeking 
enforcement of the order of the Decree of Divorce ordered 
by the court of competent jurisdiction did not have clean 
hands, based upon allegations that damage had been to a 
trailer and motor vehicle by the wife. 
The evidence before the court evidenced that the 
day after court wherein the divorce was granted on the 
counterclaim of the wife, that the wife went to Salmon, 
Idaho, and was there for two and one-half weeks (TR-9), 
and that the truck and camper, which was kept in the 
back yard of the residence wherein the wife resided, had 
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not been damaged by her in any way, was in good condition 
prior for her leaving for Idaho (TR-10), and that the 
husband removed the truck and camper from the premises 
of the wife while the wife was in Idaho. (TR-10) 
Testimony of the son, David Johnson, was to the 
effect that he was present at the home when the husband 
i 
and Mr. Hansen came to the house to pick up the truck and 
camper, that he had observed the condition of the units 
a week previous to it being picked up, and he did not notice 
at that time any damage or injury to the interior of the 
camper or the truck, and that he had no knowledge of any 
damage, nor had he himself done any damage to the truck 
and camper. (TR-48) 
Testimony as to the alleged damaged, which was the 
basis of the attempt by the husband to evade the condi-
tions of the Decree of Divorce issued by the Honorable 
Ronald 0. Hyde was based upon the affidavit of the husband, 
in his affidavit and answer to the Order to Show Cause 
(R-84-85), but was at no time supported by direct testimony 
in court by the husband in the Order to Show Cause hearing 
before the Honorable Judge Calvin Gould, but was testified 
to by Clinton Hansen, who alleged that he was the brother-
in-law of Walter Johnson prior to Hansen's divorce from 
the wife's sister. (TR-43) . 
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Mr. Hansen testified that the camper was located 
in the back yard of the wifefs residence, that he observed 
the damage inside the camper and to the motor vehicle, 
and his general testimony was vague and indefinite (R-44-R-46), 
and he did not testify to any personal knowledge as to who 
might have done the damage, if in fact there was any damage 
done. 
Based upon the affidavit only of the husband and 
the indefinite testimony of the husband's friend and ex-
brother-in-law of the wife, the court found that the testimony 
of the wife and that of the son was not credible, and on 
that basis held that the wife did not have clean hands. 
In Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P.2d 821, Supreme Court 
of Utah (December 1974), this court held that an action 
by a judge of concurrent jurisdiction, wherein one district 
court judge vacated the order of his colleague that such 
conduct cannot ordinarily be done, and specifically stated: 
To accomplish this feat would require such 
a procedure as appeal, or an unusual, inde-
pendent procedure of some kind, - but not 
in virtue of the ordinary motions, orders to 
show cause and the like, - all of which leads 
us to the conclusion that the decision must 
then be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this honorable court that the 
final Decree of Divorce as rendered by the Honorable 
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Ronald 0. Hyde was not subject to reversal by means of 
a colleague of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, deny-
ing to the wife the right to the enforcement of the order 
of the court issuing the Decree of Divorce, and that the 
Doctrine of Clean Hands cannot apply where the alleged 
aggrieved party does not testify under oath and his credi-
bility tested by direct and cross-examination before the 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C^d-T^^^^ 
1
 PETE NT VLAH0S< ES'QT 
Attorney for Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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